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ABSTRACT
IRLbot: Design and Performance Analysis of a Large-Scale Web Crawler.
(May 2008)
Hsin-Tsang Lee, B.S., National Chiao Tung University
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dmitri Loguinov
This thesis shares our experience in designing web crawlers that scale to billions
of pages and models their performance. We show that with the quadratically increas-
ing complexity of verifying URL uniqueness, breadth-first search (BFS) crawl order,
and fixed per-host rate-limiting, current crawling algorithms cannot effectively cope
with the sheer volume of URLs generated in large crawls, highly-branching spam, le-
gitimate multi-million-page blog sites, and infinite loops created by server-side scripts.
We offer a set of techniques for dealing with these issues and test their performance
in an implementation we call IRLbot. In our recent experiment that lasted 41 days,
IRLbot running on a single server successfully crawled 6.3 billion valid HTML pages
(7.6 billion connection requests) and sustained an average download rate of 319 mb/s
(1, 789 pages/s). Unlike our prior experiments with algorithms proposed in related
work, this version of IRLbot did not experience any bottlenecks and successfully han-
dled content from over 117 million hosts, parsed out 394 billion links, and discovered
a subset of the web graph with 41 billion unique nodes.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the World Wide Web (WWW) has evolved from a handful of
pages to billions of diverse objects. In order to harvest this enormous data repository,
search engines download parts of the existing web and offer Internet users access to
this database through keyword search. Search engines consist of two fundamental
components – web crawlers, which find, download, and parse content in the WWW,
and data miners, which extract keywords from pages, rank document importance,
and answer user queries. This thesis does not deal with data miners, but instead
focuses on the design of web crawlers that can scale to the size of the current and
future web, while implementing consistent per-website and per-server rate-limiting
policies and avoiding being trapped in spam farms and infinite webs. We next discuss
our assumptions and explain why this is a challenging issue.
1 Scalability
With the constant growth of the web, discovery of user-created content by web
crawlers faces an inherent tradeoff between scalability, performance, and resource
usage. The first term refers to the number of pages N a crawler can handle without
becoming “bogged down” by the various algorithms and data structures needed to
support the crawl. The second term refers to the speed S at which the crawler dis-
covers the web as a function of the number of pages already crawled. The final term
The journal model is IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
2refers to the CPU and RAM resources Σ that are required to sustain the download of
N pages at an average speed S. In most crawlers, larger N implies higher complex-
ity of checking URL uniqueness, verifying robots.txt, and scanning the DNS cache,
which ultimately results in lower S and higher Σ. At the same time, higher speed S
requires smaller data structures, which often can be satisfied only by either lowering
N or increasing Σ.
Current research literature [2], [4], [7], [9], [14], [20], [22], [23], [25], [26], [27], [16]
generally provides techniques that can solve a subset of the problem and achieve a
combination of any two objectives (i.e., large slow crawls, small fast crawls, or large
fast crawls with unlimited resources). They also do not analyze how the proposed
algorithms scale for very large N given fixed S and Σ. Even assuming sufficient
Internet bandwidth and enough disk space, the problem of designing a web crawler
that can support large N (hundreds of billions of pages), sustain reasonably high
speed S (thousands of pages/s), and operate with fixed resources Σ remains open.
2 Reputation and Spam
The web has changed significantly since the days of early crawlers [4], [23], [25], mostly
in the area of dynamically generated pages and web spam. With server-side scripts
that can create infinite loops, an unlimited number of hostnames, and spam farms
that measure billions of pages, the task of web crawling has changed from simply
doing a BFS scan of the WWW [24] to deciding in real time which sites contain
useful information and giving them higher priority as the crawl progresses.
Our experience shows that BFS becomes trapped in spam after several billion
downloaded pages, which manifests itself in multiple ways: a) the queue of pending
URLs contains a non-negligible fraction of links from spam sites that threaten to
3eventually overtake legitimate URLs due to their high branching factor; b) the DNS
resolver succumbs to the rate at which new hostnames are dynamically created within
a single spam domain; and c) the crawler becomes vulnerable to the delay attack from
sites (often spam) that purposely introduce HTTP and DNS delays in all requests
originating from the crawler’s IP address.
No prior research crawler has attempted to avoid spam or document its impact on
the collected data. Thus, designing low-overhead and robust algorithms for computing
site reputation during the crawl is the second open problem that we aim to address
in this work.
3 Politeness
Even today, webmasters become easily annoyed when web crawlers slow down their
servers, consume too much Internet bandwidth, or simply visit pages with “too much”
frequency. This leads to undesirable consequences including blocking of the crawler
from accessing the site in question, various complaints to the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) hosting the crawler, and even threats of legal action. Incorporating per-website
and per-IP hit limits into a crawler is easy; however, preventing the crawler from
“choking” when its entire RAM gets filled up with URLs pending for a small set of
hosts is much more challenging. When N grows into the billions, the crawler eventu-
ally becomes bottlenecked by its own politeness and is then faced with a decision to
suffer significant slowdown, ignore politeness considerations for certain URLs (at the
risk of crashing target servers or wasting valuable bandwidth on huge spam farms), or
discard a large fraction of backlogged URLs, none of which is particularly appealing.
While related work [2], [7], [14], [23], [27] has proposed several algorithms for
rate-limiting host access, none of these studies have addressed the possibility that a
4crawler may stall due to its politeness restrictions or discussed management of rate-
limited URLs that do not fit into RAM. This is the third open problem that we aim
to solve in this thesis.
4 Our Contributions
The first part of this thesis presents a set of web-crawler algorithms that address
the issues raised above and the second part briefly examines their performance in an
actual web crawl.1 Our design stems from three years of web crawling experience at
Texas A&M University using an implementation we call IRLbot [17] and the various
challenges posed in simultaneously: 1) sustaining a fixed crawling rate of several thou-
sand pages/s; 2) downloading billions of pages; and 3) operating with the resources
of a single server.
The first performance bottleneck we faced was caused by the complexity of ver-
ifying uniqueness of URLs and their compliance with robots.txt. As N scales into
many billions, even the disk algorithms of [23], [27] no longer keep up with the rate at
which new URLs are produced by our crawler (i.e., up to 184K per second). To un-
derstand this problem, we analyze the URL-check methods proposed in the literature
and show that all of them exhibit severe performance limitations when N becomes
sufficiently large. We then introduce a new technique called Disk Repository with
Update Management (DRUM) that can store large volumes of arbitrary hashed data
on disk and implement very fast check, update, and check+update operations using
bucket sort. We model the various approaches and show that DRUM’s overhead re-
mains close to the best theoretically possible as N reaches into the trillions of pages
and that for common disk and RAM size, DRUM can be thousands of times faster
1A separate paper will present a much more detailed analysis of the collected data.
5than prior disk-based methods.
The second bottleneck we faced was created by multi-million-page sites (both
spam and legitimate), which became backlogged in politeness rate-limiting to the
point of overflowing the RAM. This problem was impossible to overcome unless po-
liteness was tightly coupled with site reputation. In order to determine the legitimacy
of a given domain, we use a very simple algorithm based on the number of incoming
links from assets that spammers cannot grow to infinity. Our algorithm, which we call
Spam Tracking and Avoidance through Reputation (STAR), dynamically allocates the
budget of allowable pages for each domain and all of its subdomains in proportion
to the number of in-degree links from other domains. This computation can be done
in real time with little overhead using DRUM even for millions of domains in the
Internet. Once the budgets are known, the rates at which pages can be downloaded
from each domain are scaled proportionally to the corresponding budget.
The final issue we faced in later stages of the crawl was how to prevent live-locks
in processing URLs that exceed their budget. Periodically re-scanning the queue of
over-budget URLs produces only a handful of good links at the cost of huge overhead.
As N becomes large, the crawler ends up spending all of its time cycling through
failed URLs and makes very little progress. The solution to this problem, which we
call Budget Enforcement with Anti-Spam Tactics (BEAST), involves a dynamically
increasing number of disk queues among which the crawler spreads the URLs based
on whether they fit within the budget or not. As a result, almost all pages from
sites that significantly exceed their budgets are pushed into the last queue and are
examined with lower frequency as N increases. This keeps the overhead of reading
spam at some fixed level and effectively prevents it from “snowballing.”
The above algorithms were deployed in IRLbot [17] and tested on the Internet
in June-August 2007 using a single server attached to a 1 gb/s backbone of Texas
6A&M. Over a period of 41 days, IRLbot issued 7, 606, 109, 371 connect requests to
117, 576, 295 hosts, received 7, 437, 281, 300 HTTP responses, and successfully down-
loaded N = 6, 380, 051, 942 unique HTML pages at an average rate of 319 mb/s
(1, 789 pages/s). Even after severely handicapping quickly branching spam and over
30 million low-ranked domains, IRLbot parsed out 394, 619, 023, 142 links and found
41, 502, 195, 631 unique pages residing on 641, 982, 061 hosts, which explains our in-
terest in crawlers that scale to tens and hundreds of billions of pages as we believe a
good fraction of 35B URLs not crawled in this experiment contains useful content.2
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section II overviews related work.
Section III defines our objectives and classifies existing approaches. Section IV dis-
cusses how checking URL uniqueness scales with crawl size and proposes our tech-
nique. Section V models caching and studies its relationship with disk overhead.
Section VI discusses our approach to ranking domains and Section VII introduces
a scalable method of enforcing budgets. Section VIII summarizes our experimental
statistics and Section IX concludes the thesis.
2Performing site searches for all top-level domains (e.g., “site:.com”), Google’s
index size can be estimated at 30 billion pages and Yahoo’s at 37 billion.
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RELATED WORK
There is only a limited number of papers describing detailed web-crawler algorithms
and offering their experimental performance. First-generation designs [9], [22], [25],
[26] were developed to crawl the infant web and commonly reported collecting less
than 100, 000 pages. Second-generation crawlers [2], [7], [15], [14], [23], [27] often
reached several hundred million pages in their crawls and typically involved multiple
agents in the crawling process. We discuss their design and scalability issues in the
next section.
Another direction was undertaken by the Internet Archive [6], [16], which main-
tains a history of the Internet by downloading the same set of pages over and over.
In the last 10 years, this database has collected over 85 billion pages, but only a
small fraction of them are unique. Additional crawlers are [4], [8], [13], [20], [28], [29];
however, their focus usually does not include the large scale assumed in this thesis
and their fundamental crawling algorithms are not presented in sufficient detail to be
analyzed here.
The largest prior crawl using a fully-disclosed implementation appeared in [23],
where Mercator obtained N = 473 million HTML pages in 17 days (we exclude non-
HTML content since it has no effect on scalability). The fastest reported crawler was
[13] with 816 pages/s, but the scope of that crawl was only N = 25 million. Finally,
to our knowledge, the largest web dataset used in any paper was AltaVista’s 2003
crawl with 1.4 billion pages [11].
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OBJECTIVES AND CLASSIFICATION
This section formalizes the purpose of web crawling and classifies algorithms in related
work, some of which we study later in the thesis.
1 Crawler Objectives
We assume that the ideal task of a crawler is to start from a set of seed URLs Ω0
and eventually crawl the set of all pages Ω∞ that can be discovered from Ω0 using
HTML links. While Ω∞ is likely to be infinite, the crawler is allowed to decide the
order in which URLs are downloaded and discard pages it believes are spam in order
to achieve a reasonably good coverage of the set of “useful” pages ΩU ⊆ Ω∞. Due to
the existence of legitimate sites with hundreds of millions of pages (e.g., ebay.com,
yahoo.com, blogspot.com), the crawler cannot make any restricting assumptions on
the maximum number of pages per host, the number of hosts per domain, the number
of domains in the Internet, or the number of pages in the crawl. We thus classify
algorithms as non-scalable if they impose hard limits on any of these metrics or are
unable to maintain crawling speed when these parameters become very large.
We should also explain why this thesis focuses on the performance of a single
server rather than some distributed architecture. If one server can scale to N pages
and maintain speed S, then with sufficient bandwidth it trivially follows that m
servers can maintain speed mS and scale to mN pages by simply partitioning the
subset of all URLs and data structures between themselves (we assume that the
bandwidth needed to shuffle the URLs between the servers is also well provisioned).
9Table I. Comparison of Prior Crawlers and Their Data Structures
Crawler Year Crawl size URLseen RobotsCache DNScache Q
(HTML pages) RAM Disk RAM Disk
WebCrawler [25] 1994 50K database – – database
Internet Archive [6] 1997 N/A site-based – site-based – site-based RAM
Mercator-A [14] 1999 41M LRU seek LRU – – disk
Mercator-B [23] 2001 473M LRU batch LRU – – disk
Polybot [27] 2001 120M tree batch database database disk
WebBase [7] 2001 125M site-based – site-based – site-based RAM
UbiCrawler [2] 2002 45M site-based – site-based – site-based RAM
Therefore, the aggregate performance of a server farm is ultimately governed by the
characteristics of individual servers and their local limitations. We explore these
limits in detail throughout the thesis.
2 Crawler Operation
The functionality of a basic web crawler can be broken down into several phases: 1)
removal of the next URL u from the queue Q of pending pages; 2) download of u and
extraction of new URLs u1, . . . , uk from u’s HTML tags; 3) for each ui, verification of
uniqueness against some structure URLseen and checking compliance with robots.txt
using some other structure RobotsCache; 4) addition of passing URLs to Q and
URLseen; 5) update of RobotsCache if necessary. The crawler may also maintain its
own DNScache structure in cases when the local DNS server is not able to efficiently
cope with the load (e.g., its RAM cache does not scale to the number of hosts seen
by the crawler or it becomes very slow after caching hundreds of millions of records).
A summary of prior crawls and their methods in managing URLseen, RobotsCache,
DNScache, and queue Q is shown in Table I. The table demonstrates that two ap-
proaches to storing visited URLs have emerged in the literature: RAM-only and
hybrid RAM-disk. In the former case [2], [6], [7], crawlers keep a small subset of hosts
in memory and visit them repeatedly until a certain depth or some target number
10
of pages has been downloaded from each site. URLs that do not fit in memory are
discarded and sites are assumed to never have more than some fixed volume of pages.
This approach performs truncated web crawls that require different techniques from
those studied here and will not be considered in our comparison.
In the latter approach [14], [23], [25], [27], URLs are first checked against a buffer
of popular links and those not found are examined using a disk file. The buffer may
be a cache based on the Least Recently Used (LRU) replacement algorithm [14], [23],
an array of recently added URLs [14], [23], a general-purpose database with RAM
caching [25], and a balanced tree of URLs pending a disk check [27].
Most prior approaches keep RobotsCache in RAM and either crawl each host to
exhaustion [2], [6], [7] or use an LRU cache in memory [14], [23]. The only hybrid
approach is used in [27], which employs a general-purpose database for storing down-
loaded robots.txt and relevant DNS records. Finally, with the exception of [27], prior
crawlers do not perform DNS caching and rely on the local DNS server to store these
records for them.
11
CHAPTER IV
SCALABILITY OF DISK METHODS
We next describe three disk-check algorithms proposed in prior literature, analyze
their performance, and then introduce our approach.
1 Algorithms
In Mercator-A [14], URLs that are not found in memory cache are looked up on disk
by seeking within the URLseen file and loading the relevant block of hashes. A similar
approach is used in WebCrawler [25], where a general-purpose database performs
multiple seeks (assuming a common B-tree implementation) to find URLs on disk.
Even with a redundant array of inexpensive disks (RAID), disk seeking cannot be
reduced to below 3− 5 ms, which is several orders of magnitude slower than required
in actual web crawls (e.g., 5−10 microseconds in IRLbot). General-purpose databases
that we have examined are much worse and experience a significant slowdown (i.e.,
10 − 50 ms per lookup) after about 100 million inserted records. Therefore, these
approaches do not appear viable unless RAM caching can achieve some enormously
high hit rates (i.e., 99.7% for IRLbot). We examine whether this is possible in the
next section when studying caching.
To avoid the bottleneck of disk-seeking, Mercator-B [23] and Polybot [27] use a
so-called batch disk check – they accumulate a buffer of URLs in memory and then
merge it with a sorted URLseen file in one pass. Mercator-B stores only hashes of
new URLs in RAM and places their text on disk. In order to retain the mapping
from hashes to the text, a special pointer is attached to each hash. After the memory
12
buffer is full, it is sorted in place and then compared with blocks of URLseen as they
are read from disk. Non-duplicate URLs are merged with those already on disk and
written into a new version of URLseen. Pointers are then used to recover the text of
unique URLs and append it to the disk queue.
Polybot keeps the entire URLs (i.e., actual strings) in memory and organizes
them into a binary search tree. Once the tree size exceeds some threshold, it is
merged with the disk file URLseen, which contains compressed URLs already seen
by the crawler. Besides being enormously CPU intensive (i.e., compression of URLs
and search in binary string trees are very slow in our experience), this method has
to perform more frequent scans of URLseen than Mercator-B due to the less-efficient
usage of RAM.
2 Modeling Prior Methods
Assume the crawler is in some steady state where the probability of uniqueness p
among new URLs remains constant (we verify that this holds in practice later in the
thesis). Further assume that the current size of URLseen is U entries, the size of RAM
allocated to URL checks is R, the average number of links per downloaded page is l,
the average URL length is b, the URL compression ratio is q, and the crawler expects
to visit N pages. It then follows that n = lN links must pass through URL check,
np of them are unique, and bq is the average number of bytes in a compressed URL.
Finally, denote by H the size of URL hashes used by the crawler and P the size of a
memory pointer. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 1. The overall disk overhead of batch disk check is ω(n,R) = α(n,R)bn,
where for Mercator-B:
α(n,R) =
2(2UH + pHn)(H + P )
bR
+ 2 + p (1)
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and for Polybot:
α(n,R) =
2(2Ubq + pbqn)(b+ 4P )
bR
+ p. (2)
Proof. To prevent locking on URL check, both Mercator-B and Polybot must use
two buffers of accumulated URLs (i.e., one for checking the disk and the other for
newly arriving data). Assume this half-buffer allows storage of m URLs (i.e., m =
R/2(H + P ) for Mercator-B and m = R/2(b + 4P ) for Polybot) and the size of the
original disk file is f (i.e., f = UH for Mercator-B and f = Ubq for Polybot).
For Mercator-B, the i-th iteration requires writing/reading ofmb bytes of arriving
URL strings, reading the current URLseen, writing it back, and appending mp hashes
to it, i.e., 2f + 2mb + 2mpH(i − 1) +mpH bytes. This leads to the following after
adding the final overhead to store pbn bytes of unique URLs in the queue:
ω(n) =
n/m∑
i=1
(2f + 2mb+ 2mpHi−mpH) + pbn
= nb
(
2(2UH + pHn)(H + P )
bR
+ 2 + p
)
. (3)
For Polybot, the i-th iteration has overhead 2f + 2mpbq(i − 1) + mpbq, which
yields:
ω(n) =
n/m∑
i=1
(2f + 2mpbqi−mpbq) + pbn
= nb
(
2(2Ubq + pbqn)(b+ 4P )
bR
+ p
)
(4)
and leads to (2).
This result shows that ω(n,R) is a product of two elements: the number of
bytes bn in all parsed URLs and how many times α(n,R) they are written to/read
from disk. If α(n,R) grows with n, the crawler’s overhead will scale super-linearly and
may eventually become overwhelming to the point of stalling the crawler. As n→∞,
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the quadratic term in ω(n,R) dominates the other terms, which places Mercator-B’s
asymptotic performance at
ω(n,R) =
2(H + P )pHn2
R
(5)
and that of Polybot at
ω(n,R) =
2(b+ 4P )pbqn2
R
. (6)
The ratio of these two terms is (H +P )H/bq(b+4P ), which for the IRLbot case
with H = 8 bytes, P = 4 bytes, b = 110, and using very optimistic bq = 5 bytes
shows that Mercator-B is roughly 7.2 times faster than Polybot as n→∞.
The best performance of any method that stores the text of URLs on disk before
checking them against URLseen (e.g., Mercator-B) is αmin = 2 + p, which is the
overhead needed to write all bn bytes to disk, read them back for processing, and then
append bpn bytes to the queue. Methods with memory-kept URLs (e.g., Polybot)
have an absolute lower bound of α′min = p, which is the overhead needed to write the
unique URLs to disk. Neither bound is achievable in practice, however.
3 DRUM
We now describe the URL-check algorithm used in IRLbot, which belongs to a more
general framework we call Disk Repository with Update Management (DRUM). The
purpose of DRUM is to allow for efficient storage of large collections of <key,value>
pairs, where key is a unique identifier (hash) of some data and value is arbitrary
information attached to the key. There are three supported operations on these
pairs – check, update, and check+update. In the first case, the incoming set of
data contains keys that must be checked against those stored in the disk cache and
15
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<key,value> buffer 1 
RAM 
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Fig. 1. Operation of DRUM.
classified as being duplicate or unique. For duplicate keys, the value associated with
each key can be optionally retrieved from disk and used for some processing. In the
second case, the incoming list contains <key,value> pairs that need to be merged
into the existing disk cache. If a given key exists, its value is updated (e.g., overridden
or incremented); if it does not, a new entry is created in the disk file. Finally, the
third operation performs both check and update in one pass through the disk cache.
Also note that DRUM can be supplied with a mixed list where some entries require
just a check, while others need an update.
A high-level overview of DRUM is shown in Figure 1. In the figure, a continuous
stream of tuples <key,value,aux> arrives into DRUM, where aux is some auxiliary
data associated with each key. DRUM spreads pairs <key,value> between k disk
buckets QH1 , . . . , Q
H
k based on their key (i.e., all keys in the same bucket have the
same bit-prefix). This is accomplished by feeding pairs <key,value> into k memory
arrays of size M each and then continuously writing them to disk as the buffers fill
up. The aux portion of each key (which usually contains the text of URLs) from the
i-th bucket is kept in a separate file QTi in the same FIFO order as pairs <key,value>
in QHi . Note that to maintain fast sequential writing/reading, all buckets are pre-
16
allocated on disk before they are used.
Once the largest bucket reaches a certain size r < R, the following process is
repeated for i = 1, . . . , k: 1) bucket QHi is read into the bucket buffer shown in
Figure 1 and sorted; 2) the disk cache Z is sequentially read in chunks of ∆ bytes
and compared with the keys in bucket QHi to determine their uniqueness; 3) those
<key,value> pairs in QHi that require an update are merged with the contents of the
disk cache and written to the updated version of Z; 4) after all unique keys in QHi are
found, their original order is restored, QTi is sequentially read into memory in blocks
of size ∆, and the corresponding aux portion of each unique key is sent for further
processing (see below). An important aspect of this algorithm is that all buckets are
checked in one pass through disk cache Z.1
We now explain how DRUM is used for storing crawler data. The most important
DRUM object is URLseen, which implements only one operation – check+update. In-
coming tuples are <URLhash,-,URLtext>, where the key is an 8-byte hash of each
URL, the value is empty, and the auxiliary data is the URL string. After all unique
URLs are found, their text strings (aux data) are sent to the next queue for pos-
sible crawling. For caching robots.txt, we have another DRUM structure called
RobotsCache, which supports asynchronous check and update operations. For checks,
it receives tuples <HostHash,-,URLtext> and for updates <HostHash,HostData,->,
where HostData contains the relevant robots.txt file, IP address of the host, and op-
tionally other host-related information. The final DRUM object that we describe in
this section is called RobotsRequested and is used for storing the hashes of sites for
which a robots.txt has been requested. Similar to URLseen, it only supports simulta-
1Note that disk bucket sort is a well-known technique that exploits uniformity of
keys; however, its usage in checking URL uniqueness and the associated performance
model of web crawling has not been explored before.
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Fig. 2. High level organization of IRLbot.
neous check+update and its incoming tuples are <HostHash,-,HostText>.
Figure 2 shows the flow of new URLs produced by the crawling threads. They
are first sent directly to URLseen using check+update. Duplicate URLs are discarded
and unique ones are sent for verification of their compliance with the budget (both
STAR and BEAST are discussed later in the thesis). URLs that pass the budget
are queued to be checked against robots.txt using RobotsCache. URLs that have
a matching robots.txt file are classified immediately as passing or failing. Passing
URLs are queued in Q and later downloaded by the crawling threads. Failing URLs
are discarded.
URLs that do not have a matching robots.txt are sent to the back of queue
QR and their hostnames are passed through RobotsRequested using check+update.
Sites whose hash is not already present in this file are fed through queue QD into
a special set of threads that perform DNS lookups and download robots.txt. They
subsequently issue a batch update to RobotsCache using DRUM. Since in steady-
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state (i.e., excluding the initial phase) the time needed to download robots.txt is
much smaller than the average delay in QR (i.e., 1-2 days), each URL makes no more
than one cycle through this loop. In addition, when RobotsCache detects that certain
robots.txt or DNS records have become outdated, it marks all corresponding URLs as
“unable to check, outdated records,” which forces RobotsRequested to pull a new set
of exclusion rules and/or perform another DNS lookup. Old records are automatically
expunged during the update when RobotsCache is re-written.
It should be noted that URLs are kept in memory only when they are needed for
immediate action and all queues in Figure 2 are stored on disk. We should also note
that DRUM data structures can support as many hostnames, URLs, and robots.txt
exception rules as disk space allows.
4 DRUM Model
Assume that the crawler maintains a buffer of size M = 256 KB for each open file
and that the hash bucket size r must be at least ∆ = 32 MB to support efficient
reading during the check-merge phase. Further assume that the crawler can use up
to D bytes of disk space for this process. Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2. Assuming that R ≥ 2∆(1 + P/H), DRUM’s URLseen overhead is
ω(n,R) = α(n,R)bn, where:
α(n,R) =

8M(H+P )(2UH+pHn)
bR2
+ 2 + p+ 2H
b
R2 < Λ
(H+b)(2UH+pHn)
bD
+ 2 + p+ 2H
b
R2 ≥ Λ
(7)
and Λ = 8MD(H + P )/(H + b).
Proof. Memory R needs to support 2k open file buffers and one block of URL hashes
that are loaded from QHi . In order to compute block size r, recall that it gets expanded
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by a factor of (H + P )/H when read into RAM due to the addition of a pointer to
each text value. We thus obtain that r(H + P )/H + 2Mk = R or:
r =
(R− 2Mk)H
H + P
. (8)
Our disk restriction then gives us that the size of all buckets kr and their text
krb/H must be equal to D:
kr +
krb
H
=
k(H + b)(R− 2Mk)
H + P
= D. (9)
It turns out that not all pairs (R, k) are feasible. The reason is that if R is set
too small, we are not able to fill all of D with buckets since 2Mk will leave no room
for r ≥ ∆.
Re-writing (9), we obtain a quadratic equation 2Mk2 − Rk + A = 0, where
A = (H+P )D/(H+ b). If R2 < 8MA, we have no solution and thus R is insufficient
to support D. In that case, we need to maximize k(R − 2Mk) subject to k ≤ km,
where
km =
1
2M
(
R− ∆(H + P )
H
)
(10)
is the maximum number of buckets that still leave room for r ≥ ∆. Maximizing
k(R− 2Mk), we obtain the optimal point k0 = R/(4M). Assuming that R ≥ 2∆(1+
P/H), condition k0 ≤ km is always satisfied. Using k0 buckets brings our disk usage
to D′ = (H + b)R2/8M(H + P ), which is always less than D.
In the case R2 ≥ 4MA, we can satisfy D and the correct number of buckets k is
given by two choices:
k =
R±√R2 − 8MA
4M
. (11)
The reason why we have two values is that we can achieve D either by using
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few buckets (i.e., k is small and r is large) or many buckets (i.e., k is large and r is
small). The correct solution is to take the smaller root to minimize the number of
open handles and disk fragmentation. Putting things together:
k1 =
R−√R2 − 8MA
4M
. (12)
Note that we still need to ensure k1 ≤ km, which holds when:
R ≥ ∆(H + P )
H
+
2MAH
∆(H + P )
. (13)
Given that R ≥ 2∆(1 + P/H) from the statement of the theorem, it is easy to verify
that (13) is always satisfied.
Next, for the i-th iteration that fills up all k buckets, we need to write/read
QTi once (overhead 2krb/H) and read/write each bucket once as well (overhead 2kr).
The remaining overhead is reading/writing URLseen (overhead 2f +2krp(i− 1)) and
appending the new URL hashes (overhead krp). We thus obtain that we need nH/kr
iterations and:
ω(n,R) =
nH/kr∑
i=1
(
2f +
2krb
H
+ 2kr + 2krpi− krp
)
+ pbn
= nb
(
(2UH + pHn)H
bkr
+ 2 + p+
2H
b
)
. (14)
Recalling our two conditions, we use k0r = HR
2/8M(H + P ) for R2 < 8MA to
obtain:
ω(n,R) = nb
(
8M(H + P )(2UH + pHn)
bR2
+ 2 + p+
2H
b
)
. (15)
For the other case R2 ≥ 8MA, we have k1r = DH/(H + b) and thus get:
ω(n,R) = nb
(
(H + b)(2UH + pHn)
bD
+ 2 + p+
2H
b
)
, (16)
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Table II. Overhead α(n,R) in Crawling N Pages for R = 1 GB, D = 4.3 TB
N Mercator-B Polybot DRUM
800M 11.6 69 2.26
8B 93 663 2.35
80B 917 6, 610 3.3
800B 9, 156 66, 082 12.5
8T 91, 541 660, 802 104
which leads to the statement of the theorem.
The two cases in (7) can be explained as follows. The first condition R2 < Λ
means that R is not enough to fill up the entire disk space D since 2Mk memory
buffers do not leave enough space for the bucket buffer with size r ≥ ∆. In this case,
the overhead depends only on R since it is the bottleneck of the system. The second
case R2 ≥ Λ means that memory size allows the crawler to use more disk space than
D, which results in the disk now becoming the bottleneck. In order to match D to a
given RAM size R and avoid unnecessary allocation of disk space, one should operate
at the optimal point given by R2 = Λ:
Dopt =
R2(H + b)
8M(H + P )
. (17)
For example, R = 1 GB produces Dopt = 4.39 TB and R = 2 GB produces
Dopt = 17 TB. For D = Dopt, the corresponding number of buckets is kopt = R/4M ,
the size of the bucket buffer is ropt = RH/2(H+P ) ≈ 0.33R, and the leading quadratic
term of ω(n,R) in (7) is now R/4M times smaller than in Mercator-B. This ratio is
1000 for R = 1 GB and 8000 for R = 8 GB. The asymptotic speed-up in either case
is significant.
Finally, observe that the best possible performance of any method that stores
both hashes and URLs on disk is α′′min = 2 + p+ 2H/b.
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5 Comparison
We next compare disk performance of the studied methods when non-quadratic terms
in ω(n,R) are non-negligible. Table II shows α(n,R) of the three studied methods for
fixed RAM size R and disk D as N increases from 800 million to 8 trillion (p = 1/9,
U = 100M pages, b = 110 bytes, l = 59 links/page). As N reaches into the trillions,
both Mercator-B and Polybot exhibit overhead that is thousands of times larger than
the optimal and invariably become “bogged down” in re-writing URLseen. On the
other hand, DRUM stays within a factor of 50 from the best theoretically possible
value (i.e., α′′min = 2.256) and does not sacrifice nearly as much performance as the
other two methods.
Since disk size D is likely to be scaled with N in order to support the newly
downloaded pages, we assume for the next example that D(n) is the maximum of
1 TB and the size of unique hashes appended to URLseen during the crawl of N
pages, i.e., D(n) = max(pHn, 1012). Table III shows how dynamically scaling disk
size allows DRUM to keep the overhead virtually constant as N increases.
To compute the maximum crawling rate that the above methods support, assume
that W is the average disk I/O speed and consider the next result.
Theorem 3. The maximum average download rate (in pages/s) supported by the disk
portion of URL uniqueness checks is:
Sdisk =
W
α(n,R)bl
. (18)
Proof. The time needed to perform uniqueness checks for n new URLs is spent in
disk I/O involving ω(n,R) = α(n,R)bn = α(n,R)blN bytes. Assuming that W is the
average disk I/O speed, it takes N/S seconds to generate n new URLs and ω(n,R)/W
seconds to check their uniqueness. Equating the two entities, we have (18).
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Table III. Overhead α(n,R) in Crawling N Pages for D = D(n)
N R = 4 GB R = 8 GB
Mercator-B DRUM Mercator-B DRUM
800M 4.48 2.30 3.29 2.30
8B 25 2.7 13.5 2.7
80B 231 3.3 116 3.3
800B 2, 290 3.3 1, 146 3.3
8T 22, 887 8.1 11, 444 3.7
We use IRLbot’s parameters to illustrate the applicability of this theorem. Ne-
glecting the process of appending new URLs to the queue, the crawler’s read and
write overhead is symmetric. Then, assuming IRLbot’s 1-GB/s read speed and 350-
MB/s write speed (24-disk RAID-5), we obtain that its average disk read-write speed
is equal to 675 MB/s. Allocating 15% of this rate for checking URL uniqueness2, the
effective disk bandwidth of the server can be estimated at W = 101.25 MB/s. Given
the conditions of Table III for R = 8 GB and assuming N = 8 trillion pages, DRUM
yields a sustained download rate of Sdisk = 4192 pages/s (i.e., 721 mb/s using IRL-
bot’s average page size of 21.5 KB). With 10 DRUM servers and a 10-gb/s Internet
link, one could create a search engine with a download capacity of 100 billion pages
per month. In crawls of the same scale, Mercator-B would be 3075 times slower and
would admit an average rate of only 1.4 pages/s. Since with these parameters Polybot
is 7.2 times slower than Mercator-B, its average crawling speed would be 0.2 pages/s.
2Additional disk I/O is needed to support the various queues, store the downloaded
content, verify robots.txt, perform reputation analysis, and enforce budgets.
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CHAPTER V
CACHING
To understand whether caching provides improved performance, one must consider a
complex interplay between the available CPU capacity, spare RAM size, disk speed,
performance of the caching algorithm, and crawling rate. This is a three-stage process
– we first examine how cache size and crawl speed affect the hit rate, then analyze
the CPU restrictions of caching, and finally couple them with RAM/disk limitations
using analysis in the previous section.
1 Cache Hit Rate
Assume that c bytes of RAM are available to the cache and that each entry incurs
fixed overhead γ bytes, giving us E = c/γ elements in the cache. Then define pi(c, S)
to be the cache miss rate under crawling speed S pages/s and cache size c. The reason
why pi depends on S is that the faster the crawl, the more pages it produces between
visits to the same site, which is where duplicate links are most prevalent. Defining
τh to be the per-host visit delay, common sense suggests that pi(c, S) should depend
not only on c, but also on τhlS.
Table IV shows LRU cache hit rates 1 − pi(c, S) during several stages of our
crawl. We seek in the trace file to the point where the crawler has downloaded N0
pages and then simulate LRU hit rates by passing the next 10E URLs discovered by
the crawler through the cache. As the table shows, a significant jump in hit rates
happens between 4M and 8M entries. This is consistent with IRLbot’s peak value
of τhlS ≈ 7.3 million. Note that before cache size reaches this value, most hits in
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Table IV. LRU Hit Rates Starting at N0 Crawled Pages
Cache elements E N0 = 1B N0 = 4B
256K 19% 16%
4M 26% 22%
8M 68% 59%
16M 71% 67%
64M 73% 73%
512M 80% 78%
the cache stem from redundant links within the same page. As E starts to exceed
τhlS, popular URLs on each site survive between repeat visits and continue staying in
the cache as long as the corresponding site is being crawled. Additional simulations
confirming this effect are omitted for brevity.
Unlike [5], which suggests that E be set 100− 500 times larger than the number
of threads, our results show that E must be slightly larger than τhlS to achieve 60%
hit rate and as high as 10τhlS to achieve 73%.
2 Cache Speed
Another aspect of keeping a RAM cache is the speed at which potentially large mem-
ory structures must be checked and updated as new URLs keep pouring in. Since
searching large trees in RAM usually results in misses in the CPU cache, some of
these algorithms can become very slow as the depth of the search increases. Define
0 ≤ φ(S) ≤ 1 to be the average CPU utilization of the server with a download rate
S pages/s and µ(c) to be the number of URLs/s that a caching algorithm with cache
size c can process on an unloaded server. Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 4. Assuming φ(S) is monotonically non-decreasing, the maximum down-
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load rate Scache (in pages/s) supported by URL caching is:
Scache(c) = g
−1(µ(c)), (19)
where g−1 is the inverse of g(x) = lx/(1− φ(x)).
Proof. We assume that caching performance linearly depends on the available CPU
capacity, i.e., if fraction φ(S) of the CPU is allocated to crawling, then the caching
speed is µ(c)(1 − φ(S)) URLs/s. Then, the maximum crawling speed would match
the rate of URL production to that of the cache, i.e.,
lS = µ(c)(1− φ(S)). (20)
Re-writing (20) using g(x) = lx/(1 − φ(x)), we have g(x) = µ(c), which has a
unique solution x = g−1(µ(c)) since g(x) is a strictly increasing function with a proper
inverse.
For the common case φ(S) = S/Smax, where Smax is the server’s maximum (i.e.,
CPU-limited) rate in pages/s, (19) yields a very simple expression:
Scache(c) =
µ(c)Smax
lSmax + µ(c)
. (21)
Table V compares the speed of several memory structures on the IRLbot server
using E = 16M elements and model (21) for Smax = 4000 pages/s. As can be seen
in the table, insertion of text URLs into a balanced tree (used in Polybot [27]) is
the slowest operation that also consumes the most memory. The speed of classical
LRU caching (185K/s) and hash-trees (416K/s) is only slightly better since both use
multiple (i.e., log2E) jumps through memory. CLOCK [5], which is a space and time
optimized approximation to LRU, achieves a much better speed (2M/s), requires less
RAM, and is a suitable for crawling rates up to 3577 pages/s on this server.
27
Table V. Insertion Rate and Maximum Crawling Speed from (21)
Method µ(c) URLs/s Size Scache
Balanced tree (strings) 113K 2.2 GB 1295
Tree-based LRU (8-byte int) 185K 1.6 GB 1757
Balanced tree (8-byte int) 416K 768 MB 2552
CLOCK (8-byte int) 2M 320 MB 3577
Random array (8-byte int) 77M 128 MB 5972
Seq array (8-byte int) 277M 128 MB 5992
Table VI. Overhead α(pin,R − c) in Crawling N Pages for D = D(n) Using Caching
with pi = 0.33, c = 320 MB
N R = 4 GB R = 8 GB
Mercator-B DRUM Mercator-B DRUM
800M 3.02 2.27 2.54 2.27
8B 10.4 2.4 6.1 2.4
80B 84 3.3 41 3.3
800B 823 3.3 395 3.3
8T 8, 211 4.5 3, 935 3.3
After experimentally determining µ(c) and φ(S), one can easily compute Scache
from (19); however, this metric by itself does not determine whether caching should
be enabled or even how to select the optimal cache size c. Even though caching
reduces the disk overhead by sending a factor of pi fewer URLs to be checked against
the disk, it also consumes more memory and leaves less space for the buffer of URLs in
RAM, which in turn results in more scans through disk to determine URL uniqueness.
Understanding this tradeoff involves careful modeling of hybrid RAM-disk algorithms,
which we perform next.
3 Hybrid Performance
We now address the issue of how to assess the performance of disk-based methods
with RAM caching. Mercator-A improves performance by a factor of 1/pi since only
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Table VII. Maximum Hybrid Crawling Rate maxc Shybrid(c) for D = D(n)
N R = 4 GB R = 8 GB
Mercator-B DRUM Mercator-B DRUM
800M 18, 051 26, 433 23, 242 26, 433
8B 6, 438 25, 261 10, 742 25, 261
80B 1, 165 18, 023 2, 262 18, 023
800B 136 18, 023 274 18, 023
8T 13.9 11, 641 27.9 18, 023
pin URLs are sought from disk. Given common values of pi ∈ [0.25, 0.35] in Table IV,
this optimization results in a 2.8− 4 times speed-up, which is clearly insufficient for
making this method competitive with the other approaches.
Mercator-B, Polybot, and DRUM all exhibit new overhead α(pi(c, S)n,R−c)bpi(c, S)n
with α(n,R) taken from the appropriate model. As n → ∞ and assuming c ¿ R,
all three methods decrease ω by a factor of pi−2 ∈ [8, 16] for pi ∈ [0.25, 0.35]. For
n ¿ ∞, however, only the linear factor bpi(c, S)n enjoys an immediate reduction,
while α(pi(c, S)n,R− c) may or may not change depending on the dominance of the
first term in (1), (2), and (7), as well as the effect of reduced RAM size R − c on
the overhead. Table VI shows one example where c = 320 MB (E = 16M elements,
γ = 20 bytes/element, pi = 0.33) occupies only a small fraction of R. Notice in the
table that caching can make Mercator-B’s disk overhead close to optimal for small
N , which nevertheless does not change its scaling performance as N →∞.
Since pi(c, S) depends on S, determining the maximum speed a hybrid approach
supports is no longer straightforward.
Theorem 5. Assuming pi(c, S) is monotonically non-decreasing in S, the maximum
download rate Shybrid supported by disk algorithms with RAM caching is:
Shybrid(c) = h
−1
(W
bl
)
, (22)
29
 
R c R c 
Shybrid(c) 
Scache(c) 
min(Shybrid(c), Scache(c)) 
copt 
Smax 
Sdisk 
Sopt 
Fig. 3. Finding optimal cache size copt and optimal crawling speed Sopt.
where h−1 is the inverse of h(x) = xα(pi(c, x)n,R− c)pi(c, x).
Proof. From (18), we have:
S =
W
α(pi(c, S)n,R− c)bpi(c, S)l , (23)
which can be written as h(S) = W/bl. The solution to this equation is S = h−1(W/bl)
where as before the inverse h−1 exists due to the strict monotonicity of h(x).
To better understand (22), we show an example of finding the best cache size c
that maximizes Shybrid(c) assuming pi(c, S) is a step function of hit rates derived from
Table IV. Specifically, pi(c, S) = 1 if c = 0, pi(c, S) = 0.84 if 0 < c < γτhlS, 0.38 if
c < 4γτhlS, 0.26 if c < 10γτhlS, and 0.22 for larger c. Table VII shows the resulting
crawling speed after maximizing (22) with respect to c. As before, Mercator-B is
close to optimal for small N and large R, but for N →∞ its performance degrades.
DRUM, on the other hand, maintains at least 11, 000 pages/s over the entire range
of N . Since these examples use large R in comparison to the cache size needed to
achieve non-trivial hit rates, the values in this table are almost inversely proportional
to those in Table VI, which can be used to ballpark the maximum value of (22)
without inverting h(x).
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Knowing function Shybrid from (22), one needs to couple it with the performance
of the caching algorithm to obtain the true optimal value of c:
copt = arg max
c∈[0,R]
min(Scache(c), Shybrid(c)), (24)
which is illustrated in Figure 3. On the left of the figure, we plot some hypothetical
functions Scache(c) and Shybrid(c) for c ∈ [0, R]. Assuming that µ(0) =∞, the former
curve always starts at Scache(0) = Smax and is monotonically non-increasing. For
pi(0, S) = 1, the latter function starts at Shybrid(0) = Sdisk and tends to zero as
c → R, but not necessarily monotonically. On the right of the figure, we show the
supported crawling rate min(Scache(c), Shybrid(c)) whose maximum point corresponds
to the pair (copt, Sopt). If Sopt > Sdisk, then caching should be enabled with c = copt;
otherwise, it should be disabled. The most common case when the crawler benefits
from disabling the cache is when R is small compared to γτhlS or the CPU is the
bottleneck (i.e., Scache < Sdisk).
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CHAPTER VI
SPAM AND REPUTATION
This section explains the necessity for detecting spam during crawls and proposes a
simple technique for computing domain reputation in real-time.
1 Problems with BFS
Prior crawlers [7], [14], [23], [27] have no documented spam-avoidance algorithms and
are typically assumed to perform BFS traversals of the web graph. Several studies [1],
[3] have examined in simulations the effect of changing crawl order by applying bias
towards more popular pages. The conclusions are mixed and show that PageRank
order [4] can be sometimes marginally better than BFS [1] and sometimes moderately
worse [3], where the metric by which they are compared is the rate at which the crawler
discovers popular pages.
While BFS works well in simulations, its performance on infinite graphs and/or
in the presence of spam farms remains unknown. Our early experiments show that
crawlers eventually encounter a quickly branching site that will start to dominate the
queue after 3 − 4 levels in the BFS tree. Some of these sites are spam-related with
the aim of inflating the page rank of target hosts, while others are created by regular
users sometimes for legitimate purposes (e.g., calendars, testing of asp/php engines),
sometimes for questionable purposes (e.g., intentionally trapping unwanted robots),
and sometimes for no apparent reason at all. What makes these pages similar is
the seemingly infinite number of dynamically generated pages and/or hosts within a
given domain. Crawling these massive webs or performing DNS lookups on millions
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of hosts from a given domain not only places a significant burden on the crawler, but
also wastes bandwidth on downloading largely useless content.
Simply restricting the branching factor or the maximum number of pages/hosts
per domain is not a viable solution since there is a number of legitimate sites that con-
tain over a hundred million pages and over a dozen million virtual hosts (i.e., various
blog sites, hosting services, directories, and forums). For example, Yahoo currently
reports indexing 1.2 billion objects within its own domain and blogspot claims over
50 million users (each user gets a unique host name). Therefore, differentiating be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate web “monsters” becomes a fundamental task of any
crawler.
Note that this task does not entail assigning popularity to each potential page as
would be the case when returning query results to a user; instead, the crawler needs
to decide whether a given domain or host should be allowed to massively branch or
not. Indeed, spam-sites and various auto-generated webs with a handful of pages are
not a problem as they can be downloaded with very little effort and later classified
by data-miners using PageRank or some other appropriate algorithm. The prob-
lem only occurs when the crawler assigns to domain x download bandwidth that is
disproportionate to the value of x’s content.
Another aspect of spam classification is that it must be performed with very
little CPU/RAM effort and run in real-time at speed SL links per second, where L
is the number of unique URLs per page.
2 Controlling Massive Sites
Before we introduce our algorithm, several definitions are in order. Both host and site
refer to Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) on which valid pages reside (e.g.,
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motors.ebay.com). A server is a physical host that accepts TCP connections and
communicates content to the crawler. Note that multiple hosts may be co-located
on the same server. A top-level domain (TLD) or a country-code TLD (cc-TLD) is a
domain one level below the root in the DNS tree (e.g., .com, .net, .uk). A pay-level
domain (PLD) is any domain that requires payment at a TLD or cc-TLD registrar.
PLDs are usually one level below the corresponding TLD (e.g., amazon.com), with
certain exceptions for cc-TLDs (e.g., ebay.co.uk, det.wa.edu.au). We use a com-
prehensive list of custom rules for identifying PLDs, which have been compiled as
part of our ongoing DNS project.
While computing PageRank [19], BlockRank [18], or SiteRank [10], [30] is a po-
tential solution to the spam problem, these methods become extremely disk intensive
in large-scale applications (e.g., 41 billion pages and 657 million hosts found in our
crawl) and arguably with enough effort can be manipulated [12] by huge link farms
(i.e., millions of pages and sites pointing to a target spam page). In fact, strict
page-level rank is not absolutely necessary for controlling massively branching spam.
Instead, we found that spam could be “deterred” by budgeting the number of allowed
pages per PLD based on domain reputation, which we determine by domain in-degree
from resources that spammers must pay for. There are two options for these resources
– PLDs and IP addresses. We chose the former since classification based on IPs (first
suggested in Lycos [21]) has proven less effective since large subnets inside link farms
could be given unnecessarily high priority and multiple independent sites co-hosted
on the same IP were improperly discounted.
While it is possible to classify each site and even each subdirectory based on
their PLD in-degree, our current implementation uses a coarse-granular approach of
only limiting spam at the PLD level. Each PLD x starts with a default budget B0,
which is dynamically adjusted using some function F (dx) as x’s in-degree dx changes.
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Budget Bx represents the number of pages that are allowed to pass from x (including
all hosts and subdomains in x) to crawling threads every T time units.
Figure 4 shows how our system, which we call Spam Tracking and Avoidance
through Reputation (STAR), is organized. In the figure, crawling threads aggregate
PLD-PLD link information and send it to a DRUM structure PLDindegree, which
uses a batch update to store for each PLD x its hash hx, in-degree dx, current budget
Bx, number of unique URLs Px from domain x that have passed to budget enforce-
ment, and hashes of all in-degree neighbors in the PLD graph. Unique URLs arriving
from URLseen perform a batch check+update against PLDindegree, increment the
corresponding Px, and are given a tuple (Bx, Px) on their way to BEAST, which we
discuss in the next section.
Note that by varying the budget function F (dx), one can implement a number of
policies – crawling of only popular pages (i.e., zero budget for low-ranked domains and
maximum budget for high-ranked domains), equal distribution between all domains
(i.e., budget Bx = B0 for all x), and crawling with a bias toward popular/unpopular
pages (i.e., budget directly/inversely proportional to the PLD in-degree).
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CHAPTER VII
POLITENESS AND BUDGETS
This section discusses how to enable polite crawler operation and scalably enforce
budgets.
1 Rate Limiting
One of the main goals of IRLbot from the beginning was to adhere to strict rate-
limiting policies in accessing poorly provisioned (in terms of bandwidth or server
load) sites. While larger sites are much more difficult to crash, unleashing a crawler
that can download at 500 mb/s and allowing it unrestricted access to individual
machines would generally be regarded as a denial-of-service attack.
While prior work only enforces a certain per-host access delay τh (which varies
from 10 times the download delay of a page [23] to 30 seconds [27]), we discovered
that this presented a major problem for hosting services that co-located thousands
of virtual hosts on the same physical server and did not provision it to support
simultaneous access to all sites (which in our experience is rather common in the
current Internet). Thus, without an additional per-server limit τs, such hosts could
be easily crashed or overloaded.
We keep τh = 40 seconds for accessing all low-ranked PLDs, but then scale it
down proportional to Bx for high-ranked PLDs up to some minimum value τ
0
h . The
reason for doing so is to prevent the crawler from becoming “bogged down” in a few
massive sites with millions of pages in RAM. Without this rule, the crawler would
make very slow progress through individual sites in addition to eventually running
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out of RAM as it becomes clogged with URLs from a few “monster” networks. For
similar reasons, we keep per-server crawl delay τs at the default 1 second for low-
ranked domains and scale it down with the average budget of PLDs hosted on the
server, up to some minimum τ 0s .
Crawling threads organize URLs in two heaps – the IP heap, which enforces delay
τs, and the host heap, which enforces delay τh. The URLs themselves are stored in a
searchable tree with pointers to/from each of the heaps. By properly controlling the
coupling between budgets and crawl delays, one can ensure that the rate at which
pages are admitted into RAM is no less than their crawl rate, which results in no
memory backlog.
We should also note that threads that perform DNS lookups and download
robots.txt in Figure 2 are limited by the IP heap, but not the host heap. The reason
is that when the crawler is pulling robots.txt for a given site, no other thread can be
simultaneously accessing that site.
2 Budget Checks
We finally discuss how IRLbot’s budget enforcement works in a method we call Budget
Enforcement with Anti-Spam Tactics (BEAST). The goal of budget enforcement is not
to discard URLs, but rather to delay their download until more is known about their
legitimacy. Most sites have a low rank because they are not well linked to, but this
does not necessarily mean that their content is useless or they belong to a spam farm.
All other things equal, low-ranked domains should be crawled in some approximately
round-robin fashion with careful control of their branching. In addition, as the crawl
progresses, domains change their reputation and URLs that have earlier failed the
budget check need to be rebudgeted and possibly crawled at a different rate. Ideally,
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the crawler should be able to shuffle URLs without losing any of them and eventually
download the entire web if given infinite time.
A naive implementation of budget enforcement in prior versions of IRLbot main-
tained two queues Q and QF , where Q contained URLs that had passed the budget
and QF those that had failed. After Q was emptied, QF was read in its entirety and
again split into two queues – Q and QF . This process was then repeated indefinitely.
We next offer a simple overhead model for this algorithm. As before, assume
that S is the number of pages crawled per second and b is the average URL size.
Further define E[Bx] < ∞ to be the expected budget of a domain in the Internet,
V to be the total number of PLDs seen by the crawler in one pass through QF , and
L to be the number of unique URLs per page (recall that l in our earlier notation
allowed duplicate links). The next result shows that the naive version of BEAST
must increase disk I/O performance with crawl size N .
Theorem 6. The lowest disk I/O speed (in bytes/s) that allows the naive budget-
enforcement approach to support the download of N pages at fixed rate S is:
λ =

2bSN(L−1)
E[Bx]V
N ≥ E[Bx]V
2bS(L− 1) otherwise
. (25)
Proof. Assume that N ≥ E[Bx]V . First notice that the average number of links
allowed into QR is E[Bx]V and define interval T to be the time needed to crawl these
links, i.e., T = E[Bx]V/S. Note that T is a constant, which is important for the
analysis below. Next, by the i-th iteration through QF , the crawler has produced
TiSL links and TSi of them have been consumed through Q. Thus, the size of QF
is TiS(L − 1). Since QF must be both read and written in T time units for any i,
the disk speed λ must be 2TiS(L− 1)/T = 2iS(L− 1) URLs/s. Multiplying this by
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URL size b, we get 2ibS(L − 1) bytes/s. The final step is to realize that N = TSi
(i.e., the total number of crawled pages) and substitute i = N/TS into 2ibS(L− 1).
For the case N < E[Bx]V observe that queue size E[Bx]V must be no larger
than N and thus N = E[Bx]V must hold since we cannot extract from the queue
more elements than have been placed there.
The above analysis shows that λ = Θ(N) and that re-checking failed URLs will
eventually overwhelm any crawler regardless of its disk performance. For IRLbot
(i.e., V = 33M, E[Bx] = 11, L = 6.5, S = 3100, and b = 110), we get the minimum
disk speed of 3.7 MB/s for N = 100 million, 82 MB/s for N = 8 billion, and 820
MB/s for N = 80 billion. Given other disk-intensive tasks, IRLbot’s bandwidth for
BEAST was capped at about 100 MB/s, which explains why this design eventually
became a bottleneck in actual crawls.
The correct implementation of BEAST rechecks QF at exponentially increas-
ing intervals. As shown in Figure 5, suppose the crawler starts with j ≥ 1 queues
Q1, . . . , Qj, where Q1 is the current queue and Qj is the last queue. URLs are read
from the current queue Q1 and written into queues Q2, . . . , Qj based on their budgets.
Specifically, for a given domain x with budget Bx, the first Bx URLs are sent into Q2,
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the next Bx into Q3 and so on. BEAST can always figure out where to place URLs
using a combination of Bx and the total number of pages Px processed for domain x
(both are attached by STAR to each URL). The remaining URLs that do not fit into
Qj are all placed into QF as in the previous design.
After Q1 is emptied, the crawler moves to reading the next queue Q2 and spreads
newly arriving pages between Q3, . . . , Qj, Q1 (note the wrap-around). After it fi-
nally empties Qj, the crawler re-scans QF and splits it into j additional queues
Qj+1, . . . , Q2j. URLs that do not have enough budget for Q2j are placed into a
new version of QF . The process then repeats starting from Q1 until j reaches some
maximum OS-imposed limit or the crawl terminates.
There are two benefits to this approach. First, URLs from sites that exceed their
budget by a factor of j or more are pushed further back as j increases. This leads to
a higher probability that good URLs with enough budget will be queued and crawled
ahead of URLs in QF . The second benefit, shown in the next theorem, is that the
speed at which the disk must be read does not skyrocket to infinity.
Theorem 7. The lowest disk I/O speed (in bytes/s) that allows BEAST to support
the download of N pages at fixed rate S is:
λ = 2Sb[(2− β)(L− 1) + 1], (26)
where
β =

2E[Bx]V
N+E[Bx]V
N ≥ E[Bx]V
1 otherwise
. (27)
Proof. Assume that N ≥ E[Bx]V and suppose one iteration involves reaching QF and
doubling j. Now assume the crawler is at the end of the i-th iteration (i = 1 is the
first iteration), which means that it has emptied 2i+1−1 queues Qi and j is currently
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equal to 2i. The total time taken to reach this stage is T = E[Bx]V (2
i+1− 1)/S. The
number of URLs in QF is then TS(L− 1), which must be read/written together with
j smaller queues Q1, . . . , Qj in the time it takes to crawl these j queues. Thus, we
get that the speed must be at least:
λ = 2
TS(L− 1) + jE[Bx]V
jT0
URL/s, (28)
where T0 = E[Bx]V/S is the time to crawl one queue Qi. Expanding, we have:
λ = 2S[(2− 2−i)(L− 1) + 1] URL/s. (29)
To tie this to N , notice that the total number of URLs consumed by the crawler
is N = E[Bx]V (2
i+1 − 1) = TS. Thus,
2−i =
2E[Bx]V
N + E[Bx]V
(30)
and we directly obtain (26) after multiplying (29) by URL size b.
For the case N < E[Bx]V , we use the same reasoning as in the proof of the
previous theorem and obtain N = E[Bx]V . This leads to β = 1/2 in (27).
Notice in (27) that β ∈ [0, 1] and in (26) that as N → ∞ disk speed λ →
2Sb(2L− 1), which is roughly four times the speed needed to write all unique URLs
to disk as they are discovered during the crawl. For the examples used earlier in this
section, this implementation needs λ ≤ 8.2 MB/s regardless of crawl size N . From
the above proof, it also follows that the last stage of an N -page crawl will contain
(assuming N ≥ E[Bx]V ):
j =
1
2
( N
E[Bx]V
+ 1
)
(31)
queues. This value for N = 8B is 9 and for N = 80B only 87, neither of which is too
imposing for a modern server.
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CHAPTER VIII
EXPERIMENTS
This section briefly examines the important parameters of the crawl and highlights
our observations.
1 Summary
Between June 9 and August 3, 2007, we ran IRLbot on a quad-CPU AMD Opteron 2.6
GHz server (16 GB RAM, 24-disk RAID-5) attached to a 1-gb/s link at the campus
of Texas A&M University. The crawler was paused several times for maintenance
and upgrades, which resulted in the total active crawling span of 41.27 days. During
this time, IRLbot attempted 7, 606, 109, 371 connections and received 7, 437, 281, 300
valid HTTP replies. Excluding non-HTML content (92M pages), HTTP errors and
redirects (964M), IRLbot ended up with N = 6, 380, 051, 942 responses with status
code 200 and content-type text/html.
We next plot average 10-minute download rates for the active duration of the
crawl in Figure 6, in which fluctuations correspond to day/night bandwidth limits
imposed by the university.1 The average download rate during this crawl was 319
mb/s (1, 789 pages/s) with a peak 10-minute average rate of 470 mb/s (3, 134 pages/s).
The crawler received 143 TB of data, out of which 254 GB were robots.txt files, and
transmitted 1.8 TB of HTTP requests. Counting both compressed and uncompressed
objects, the average size of an HTML page was 21.5 KB.
1University-provided daytime bandwidth was 250 mb/s for days 5 − 32 and 200
mb/s for the rest of the crawl.
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Fig. 6. Download rates during the experiment.
IRLbot parsed out 394, 619, 023, 142 links from downloaded pages. After dis-
carding invalid URLs and known non-HTML extensions, the crawler was left with
K = 374, 707, 295, 503 potentially “crawlable” links that went through URL unique-
ness checks. We use this number to obtain K/N = l ≈ 59 links/page used throughout
the thesis. The average URL size was 70.6 bytes (after removing “http://”), but with
crawler overhead (e.g., depth in the crawl tree, IP address and port, timestamp, and
parent link) attached to each URL, their average size in the queue was b ≈ 110
bytes. The number of pages recorded in URLseen was 41, 502, 195, 631 (332 GB on
disk), which yielded L = 6.5 unique URLs per page. These pages were hosted by
641, 982, 061 unique sites.
As promised earlier, we now show in Figure 7(a) that the probability of unique-
ness p stabilizes around 0.11 once the first billion pages have been downloaded. Since
p is bounded away from 0 even at N = 6.3 billion, this suggests that our crawl has
discovered only a small fraction of the web. While we certainly know there are at
least 41 billion pages in the Internet, the fraction of them with useful content and the
number of additional pages not seen by the crawler remain a mystery at this stage.
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Fig. 7. Evolution of p throughout the crawl and effectiveness of budget-control in lim-
iting low-ranked PLDs.
2 Domain Reputation
The crawler contacted 117, 576, 295 sites, which belonged to 33, 755, 361 pay-level
domains (PLDs) and were hosted on 5, 517, 743 unique IPs. The total number of
nodes in the PLD graph was 89, 652, 630 with the number of PLD-PLD edges equal
to 1, 832, 325, 052. Without knowing how our algorithms would perform, we chose
a conservative budget function F (dx) where the crawler would give only moderate
preference to highly-ranked domains and try to branch out to discover a wide variety of
low-ranked PLDs. Specifically, top 10K ranked domains were given budget Bx linearly
interpolated between 10 and 10K pages. All other PLDs received the default budget
B0 = 10 pages. Rate-limiting delays were adjusted using the following minimums:
τ 0h = 10 seconds and τ
0
s = 1/20 second.
Figure 7(b) shows the average number of downloaded pages per PLD x based
on its in-degree dx. IRLbot crawled on average 1.2 pages per PLD with dx = 1,
68 pages per PLD with dx = 2, and 43K pages per domain with dx ≥ 512K. The
largest number of pages pulled from any PLD was 347, 613 (blogspot.com), while
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Table VIII. Top Ranked PLDs, Their PLD In-Degree, Google PageRank, and Total
Pages Crawled.
Rank Domain In-degree PageRank Pages
1 microsoft.com 2, 948, 085 9 37, 755
2 google.com 2, 224, 297 10 18, 878
3 yahoo.com 1, 998, 266 9 70, 143
4 adobe.com 1, 287, 798 10 13, 160
5 blogspot.com 1, 195, 991 9 347, 613
7 wikipedia.org 1, 032, 881 8 76, 322
6 w3.org 933, 720 10 9, 817
8 geocities.com 932, 987 8 26, 673
9 msn.com 804, 494 8 10, 802
10 amazon.com 745, 763 9 13, 157
99% of visited domains contributed to the crawl fewer than 3, 044 pages each and
90% less than 586 each. As seen in the figure, IRLbot succeeded at achieving a
strong correlation between domain popularity (i.e., in-degree) and the amount of
bandwidth allocated to that domain during the crawl.
Our manual analysis of top-1000 domains shows that most of them are highly-
ranked legitimate sites, which attests to the effectiveness of our ranking algorithm.
Several of them are listed in Table VIII together with Google’s PageRank of the
main page of each PLD and the number of pages downloaded by IRLbot. The exact
coverage of each site depended on its link structure, as well as the number of hosts
and physical servers (which determined how polite the crawler needed to be). By
changing the budget function F (dx), much more aggressive crawls of large sites could
be achieved, which may be required in practical search-engine applications.
We believe that PLD-level domain ranking by itself is not sufficient for prevent-
ing all types of spam from infiltrating the crawl and that additional fine-granular
ranking algorithms may be needed for classifying individual hosts within a domain
and possibly their subdirectory structure. Future work will address this issue, but
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our first experiment with spam-control algorithms demonstrates that these methods
are not only necessary, but also very effective in helping crawlers scale to billions of
pages.
3 Final Word
We have attempted to reach this crawl scale several times. While our prior imple-
mentations failed for one reason or another, this particular crawl was very successful
as it ran without any bottlenecks, slowdowns, or memory clogging. Analysis shown
earlier in the thesis demonstrates that IRLbot can sustain the same download speed
up to N = 8 trillion pages (given sufficient disk space and bandwidth) using the same
single-server implementation.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
This thesis tackled the issue of scaling web crawlers to billions and even trillions of
pages using a single server with constant CPU, disk, and memory speed. We identified
several impediments to building an efficient large-scale crawler and showed that they
could be overcome by simply changing the BFS crawling order and designing low-
overhead disk-based data structures. We experimentally tested our algorithms in the
Internet and found them to scale much better than the methods proposed in prior
literature.
Future work involves refining reputation algorithms, assessing their performance,
and mining the collected data.
47
REFERENCES
[1] A. Arasu, J. Cho, H. Garcia-Molina, A. Paepcke, and S. Raghavan, “Searching
the Web,” ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 2–43,
Aug. 2001.
[2] P. Boldi, B. Codenotti, M. Santini, and S. Vigna, “UbiCrawler: A Scalable Fully
Distributed Web Crawler,” Software: Practice & Experience, vol. 34, no. 8, pp.
711–726, Jul. 2004.
[3] P. Boldi, M. Santini, and S. Vigna, “Do Your Worst to Make the Best: Para-
doxical Effects in PageRank Incremental Computations,” LNCS: Algorithms and
Models for the Web-Graph, vol. 3243, pp. 168–180, Oct. 2004.
[4] S. Brin and L. Page, “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale Hypertextual Web Search
Engine,” in Proc. WWW, Apr. 1998, pp. 107–117.
[5] A. Z. Broder, M. Najork, and J. L. Wiener, “Efficient URL Caching for World
Wide Web Crawling,” in Proc. WWW, May 2003, pp. 679–689.
[6] M. Burner, “Crawling Towards Eternity: Building an Archive of the World Wide
Web,” Web Techniques Magazine, vol. 2, no. 5, May 1997.
[7] J. Cho, H. Garcia-Molina, T. Haveliwala, W. Lam, A. Paepcke, and S. R. G.
Wesley, “Stanford WebBase Components and Applications,” ACM Transactions
on Internet Technology, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 153–186, May 2006.
[8] J. Edwards, K. McCurley, and J. Tomlin, “An Adaptive Model for Optimizing
Performance of an Incremental Web Crawler,” in Proc. WWW, May 2001, pp.
106–113.
[9] D. Eichmann, “The RBSE Spider – Balancing Effective Search Against Web
Load,” in Proc. WWW, May 1994.
48
[10] G. Feng, T.-Y. Liu, Y. Wang, Y. Bao, Z. Ma, X.-D. Zhang, and W.-Y. Ma,
“AggregateRank: Bringing Order to Web Sites,” in Proc. ACM SIGIR, Aug.
2006, pp. 75–82.
[11] D. Gleich and L. Zhukov, “Scalable Computing for Power Law Graphs: Experi-
ence with Parallel PageRank,” in Proc. SuperComputing, Nov. 2005.
[12] Z. Gyongyi and H. Garcia-Molina, “Link Spam Alliances,” in Proc. VLDB, Aug.
2005, pp. 517–528.
[13] Y. Hafri and C. Djeraba, “High Performance Crawling System,” in Proc. ACM
MIR, Oct. 2004, pp. 299–306.
[14] A. Heydon and M. Najork, “Mercator: A Scalable, Extensible Web Crawler,”
World Wide Web, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 219–229, Dec. 1999.
[15] J. Hirai, S. Raghavan, H. Garcia-Molina, and A. Paepcke, “WebBase: A Repos-
itory of Web Pages,” in Proc. WWW, May 2000, pp. 277–293.
[16] Internet Archive. [Online]. Available: http://www.archive.org/.
[17] IRLbot Project at Texas A&M. [Online]. Available: http://irl.cs.tamu.edu/
crawler/.
[18] S. D. Kamvar, T. H. Haveliwala, C. D. Manning, and G. H. Golub,
“Exploiting the Block Structure of the Web for Computing PageRank,”
Stanford University, Tech. Rep., Mar. 2003. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.stanford.edu/sdkamvar/papers/blockrank.pdf.
[19] S. D. Kamvar, T. H. Haveliwala, C. D. Manning, and G. H. Golub, “Extrapo-
lation methods for accelerating PageRank computations,” in Proc. WWW, May
2003, pp. 261–270.
49
[20] K. Koht-arsa and S. Sanguanpong, “High Performance Large Scale Web Spi-
der Architecture,” in Proc. International Symposium on Communications and
Information Technology, Oct. 2002.
[21] M. Mauldin, “Lycos: Design Choices in an Internet Search Service,” IEEE Expert
Magazine, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 8–11, Jan./Feb. 1997.
[22] O. A. McBryan, “GENVL and WWWW: Tools for Taming the Web,” in Proc.
WWW, May 1994.
[23] M. Najork and A. Heydon, “High-Performance Web Crawling,” Compaq
Systems Research Center, Tech. Rep. 173, Sep. 2001. [Online]. Available:
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/Compaq-DEC/SRC-RR-173.pdf.
[24] M. Najork and J. L. Wiener, “Breadth-First Search Crawling Yields High-Quality
Pages,” in Proc. WWW, May 2001, pp. 114–118.
[25] B. Pinkerton, “Finding What People Want: Experiences with the Web Crawler,”
in Proc. WWW, Oct. 1994.
[26] B. Pinkerton, “WebCrawler: Finding What People Want,” Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Washington, 2000.
[27] V. Shkapenyuk and T. Suel, “Design and Implementation of a High-Performance
Distributed Web Crawler,” in Proc. IEEE ICDE, Mar. 2002, pp. 357–368.
[28] A. Singh, M. Srivatsa, L. Liu, and T. Miller, “Apoidea: A Decentralized Peer-to-
Peer Architecture for Crawling the World Wide Web,” in Proc. SIGIR Workshop
on Distributed Information Retrieval, Aug. 2003, pp. 126–142.
[29] T. Suel, C. Mathur, J. Wu, J. Zhang, A. Delis, M. Kharrazi, X. Long, and
K. Shanmugasundaram, “ODISSEA: A Peer-to-Peer Architecture for Scalable
Web Search and Information Retrieval,” in Proc. WebDB, Jun. 2003, pp. 67–72.
50
[30] J. Wu and K. Aberer, “Using SiteRank for Decentralized Computation of Web
Document Ranking,” in Proc. Adaptive Hypermedia, Aug. 2004, pp. 265–274.
51
VITA
Hsin-Tsang Lee received his Bachelor of Science degree in Computer Science from
National Chiao-Tung University in 1999. He received his Master of Science degree in
Computer Science from Texas A&M University in May 2008.
His research interests include web crawler design, Internet measurement, and
algorithms for large-scale networks. He can be reached at:
Hsin-Tsang Lee
137 ChungShan Road
Hsinchu, Taiwan 300
The typist for this thesis was Hsin-Tsang Lee.
